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THE MYTH OF THE CONCEPTUAL GIVEN 
 
Santiago Echeverri, PhD Candidate 
Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-ENS-EHESS) 
 
Abstract. Conceptualism conceives of perceptual experience as a source of reasons. This claim can be read in 
two ways: in a strong reading, perceptual experience is taken to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to 
justify doxastic states. In a weak reading, it is assumed to provide only the materials to form reasons, which are 
conceived as “hybrid entities” made from perceptual contents plus doxastic force. The paper shows that whereas 
the strong version is in error, the weak version is committed to a dualistic understanding of perception-judgment 
transitions. This result leads to three further conclusions: (1) conceptualism cannot rule out the existence of non-
conceptual content, (2) it is a version of the Myth of the Given, and (3) pace conceptualists, only beliefs can 
justify other beliefs. 
 





Suppose you accept a widespread analysis according to which mental acts or states 
like believing, desiring, thinking, or intending have a three-place structure: a subject S is 
related via a psychological act or state ψ to a propositional content p: S ψ’s that p. Suppose 
further that you think, as most contemporary philosophers do, that perception is the basis of 
some mental acts or states. These two assumptions should lead you to ask how perception is 
related to the cognitive attitudes listed above. 
An influential response says that perception is a source of reasons. This framework 
needs, however, to be filled in. As I see it, the suggestion should satisfy four demands. First, 
one has to provide a clear account of reasons to work with. Second, it is necessary to clarify 
what it means to claim that perception is a source of reasons. Third, one is expected to show 
that one’s analysis of perceptual states enables them to provide reasons. Fourth, one should 
specify whether by “perceptual states” one means conscious or unconscious episodes.  
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Concerning the first point, there are two main conceptions of reasons in the literature: 
they are seen either as structured contents, like facts or propositions, or as mental states, like 
beliefs. One’s answer to the second question is usually determined by one’s answer to the 
third question. Usually, perceptual states are conceived either in purely causal terms or in 
intentional terms. With this distinction in mind, one can split the original claim into different 
views: if one provides a causal analysis of perceptual states, it seems clear that they only 
deliver necessary conditions to form reasons. After all, to be caused by an experience is not 
sufficient to grasp a proposition or to form a belief. The obtaining of some causal relations is, 
however, a necessary requirement of perceptual beliefs or perceptual contents. By contrast, if 
one analyzes perceptual experiences in intentional terms, new possibilities come into view. If 
one takes it that reasons are structured entities like propositions and conceives of perceptual 
states as providing such entities, then perceptual states clearly provide reasons in the strongest 
possible sense. By contrast, if one assumes that reasons are doxastic states, and conceives of 
perceptual states as providing only pre-doxastic structured contents, one is committed to 
seeing the former as providing necessary but insufficient conditions for reasons.   
Conceptualist philosophers have motivated their view of experience by claiming that it 
is a source of reasons. Consequently, they should satisfy the four previous demands. The 
conceptualist can construe reasons either as structured entities or as belief states, and he can 
also conceive of perceptual experiences as providing either sufficient or necessary conditions 
for reasons. Furthermore, he can be seen as characterizing either conscious perceptual states 
or unconscious perceptual states.  
In what follows, I shall assume that conceptualism characterizes conscious perceptual 
states. Therefore, I will use “experience” and “perception” as synonyms. Nevertheless, as I 
will explain later, conceptualism can be construed in three different ways that reflect the 
distinctions introduced earlier: 
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 Reasons  Conceptualism 
Propositions C1. Sufficient =  Experience is a propositional pre-doxastic state  
Belief states C2. Necessary =  Experience is a propositional pre-doxastic state  
Propositions C3. Necessary =  Experience is a non-propositional pre-doxastic state 
Belief states C4. Sufficient =  Experience is a propositional doxastic state 
 
Conceptualists have oscillated between C1 and C3. In earlier writings, they have 
suggested that perceptual experience provides sufficient conditions to justify beliefs (C1). In 
this account, perceptual experiences are analyzed as pre-doxastic states that deliver facts or 
propositional contents. When put under pressure, however, conceptualists have adopted 
weaker views (C2, C3). In some cases, they have claimed that perceptual experiences deliver 
propositional contents that, albeit necessary, are not sufficient to justify perceptual beliefs. 
This suggests a commitment to a version of the doxastic account of reasons (C2). More 
recently, a prominent conceptualist, John McDowell (2008a), has suggested that perceptual 
states have non-propositional contents and, as a result, that they provide necessary but 
insufficient conditions to justify perceptual beliefs. Contrary to causal analyses, however, 
these states are assumed to belong to the intentional order (C3).  
In this paper I shall criticize versions C1 to C3 of conceptualism and exploit the results 
as evidence for C4. First, I will claim that conceptualism should be construed as a strong 
claim like C1, since only such a construal constitutes a genuine alternative to coherentism. Its 
conception of perceptual experience, however, is unable to provide sufficient conditions to 
justify doxastic states. In other words, C1 is false. Second, I will maintain that weaker 
versions of conceptualism (C2, C3) introduce a dualism in perception-judgment transitions 
that either makes the relations between the two terms unintelligible or is compatible with the 
existence of non-conceptual content. Since one of the main arguments for conceptualism is 
the rejection of non-conceptual content, these are good reasons to reject these versions as 
well. Third, I will suggest that the fluctuation between C1 to C3 is a mark of what Sellars 
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(1956) called the “Myth of the Given.” As I will explain later, Sellars’s attack on the Given is 
driven by the idea that one should not frame the mind’s relation to the world in dualistic 
terms. But this is what conceptualists do. Fourth, I will suggest that these considerations pave 
the way for a theory that takes beliefs as the minimal units of justification (C4).  
2. The conceptualist assumptions 
In the next three sections I will present the original version of conceptualism and show 
why it is committed to the bold claim that perceptual experiences, conceived as pre-doxastic 
propositional states, are sufficient to justify perceptual judgments or beliefs (C1). The main 
motivations for this view are of three kinds: (1) the identification of propositional content and 
conceptual content, (2) the assumption that doxastic accounts of perceptual experience are 
wrong, and (3) the rejection of coherentism.  
1. According to an early formulation, conceptualist accounts identify the content of 
perceptual experience with the content expressed by an embedded ‘that’-clause preceded by a 
cognitive verb (see McDowell 1994, 1998a; Brewer 1999). Conceptualists originally took this 
claim as entailing that experiences are conceptually articulated. The reasons for this view are 
two-fold. First, according to some influential accounts, the content of the “that”-clause is seen 
as a structured entity. Second, it is usually thought that its constituents should satisfy Frege’s 
criterion of cognitive value, according to which co-referential terms like “Phosphorus” and 
“Hesperus” express different concepts, given that a subject can rationally hold that 
Phosphorus is Venus, but deny that Hesperus is Venus. Under these assumptions, if one takes 
it that the content of experiences is expressed by a “that”-clause, one will be led to conclude 
that it must be conceptually articulated. 
This assumption is not uncontroversial. After all, some people have hypothesized the 
existence of non-conceptual propositional contents (Peacocke 1992, 2001; Bermúdez 1998; 
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Chalmers 2006). Hence, even if one identifies the content of experiences with the content 
expressed by a “that”-clause, it remains unclear whether it should qualify as conceptual. 
One’s views on this issue depend on one’s characterization of concepts, contents, and 
propositions. In fact, a single theory might be taken either as a form of conceptualism, or as a 
form of non-conceptualism, depending on one’s flexibility concerning these categories. Some 
people have argued that not all contents are propositional, since some contents are iconic (see 
Crane 2009). Others have argued that some non-conceptual contents satisfy Frege’s criterion 
of cognitive value (Peacocke 2001). If they are right, this shows that propositional is not 
synonymous with contentful, and suggests that concepts are not the only entities capable of 
satisfying Frege’s criterion of cognitive value. 
Fortunately, these niceties are not important for this paper, since I shall focus on a 
broader question: given that reasons require at least propositional contents, how should we 
exploit the contents of perception in the task of explaining how propositional attitudes are 
rooted in experience?  
In the first part of the paper, I will focus on propositionality as a necessary mark of 
perceptual experiences. My main thrust will be to criticize the widely-held view that ascribing 
propositional contents is sufficient to characterize the rational role of experiences. If one 
assumes that propositionality is a necessary mark of conceptual representation, the arguments 
will apply against version C1 of conceptualism. If one denies it and claims that experiences 
deliver non-conceptual propositional contents, the arguments will apply against these views as 
well. For expository reasons, however, I will accept the conceptualist assumption and focus 
on C1.1  
 2. Even if one has a clear view of content, one still has to explain what kind of attitude 
one bears towards that content. This issue has been widely neglected in recent literature (for 
some recent exceptions, see Byrne 2009, Glüer 2009, and Crane 2009). The reasons seem 
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obvious. A traditional approach, quite popular in the seventies, took beliefs as constitutive of 
perception. Defenders of this view defined perception as a disposition to acquire beliefs or as 
the acquiring of beliefs. Let us term these approaches “doxastic theories.” The trouble with 
this suggestion is that doxastic theories are so discredited nowadays that most philosophers do 
not see them as a live option.2 This has led to an impasse. Given that doxastic accounts are 
thought to be implausible, claiming that experiences have propositional contents leads to the 
view that they are non-doxastic states. But, if they are non-doxastic states, their nature is not 
entirely clear. 
 I will be working with the following idea: if perceiving had the structure of a belief 
state, one could easily spell out the way it is related to other propositional attitudes. One 
would simply have to postulate inferential links between beliefs of different levels. 
Nevertheless, given that most theorists reject doxastic theories, it is hard to see how 
perceptual experiences are related to other states until one provides a positive theory of the 
nature of those states (see Heck 2000 for a similar argument). 
This impasse exerts some pressure on so-called conceptualist theories of perception. 
Given that belief fixation is usually taken as the conceptualization mechanism par excellence, 
conceptualists have to show that there is an alternative way of conceiving perceptual 
experience as conceptually articulated, while granting that it is different from belief. In other 
words, they have to convince us that there are important differences between perceiving and 
believing, but still maintain that the former is conceptual through and through.3 
This explains, to some extent, why conceptualists have developed “pre-doxastic” or 
“pre-judgmental” approaches to perceptual experience (C1 to C3). They grant that perceptual 
experience has intentionality in its own right, and analyze it as a function of the concepts 
actualized by a subject. At the same time, they declare that perceiving is conceptually 
structured before the subject forms a judgment or fixes a belief.4 There are some examples of 
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this approach in the work of John McDowell and Bill Brewer. For the time being, I focus on 
C1. McDowell declares: 
That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment. 
It becomes the content of a judgment if the subject decides to take the experience at face value 
(McDowell 1994: 26; see also his 1998a: 438-439).5  
Brewer is equally explicit on this point: 
Of course, the move from unendorsed understanding of these perceptual demonstrative contents 
[delivered by perceptions] to endorsement of them in belief will normally be almost instantaneous, and 
only rarely involve anything like a considered decision on the subject’s part. They are importantly 
distinct stages of the story, though. The first is something for which the subject need have no 
epistemically relevant reasons, which in turn provides her with reasons of a genuinely epistemic kind 
for the second (Brewer 1999: 223 fn 5; emphasis mine).6 
 A distinctive feature of this approach is the claim that perceptual experience itself is 
conceptually structured. One’s experience is structured as p before one endorses p or takes it 
to be p. This contrast is made vivid by the use of different verbs, which are supposed to 
denote different psychological stages: first, there is a grasping or understanding of p in 
perceptual experience; later on, accepting, taking or endorsing that content in a judgment or 
belief.7 From a classical viewpoint, having a perceptual experience is like entertaining a 
propositional content, whereas judging or believing it would introduce a propositional attitude 
in its own right.8 This approach promises to solve the initial puzzle: to show that there is no 
real mystery in the way perceptual states ground judgments or beliefs, while preserving a 
clear-cut distinction between perceiving and believing.  
3. The conceptualist solution is implicitly driven by an additional concern: to show 
that the mind’s perceptual relation to the world is intrinsically normative, even though it is not 
to be conceived in the model of belief. Normativity is one of the main tenets of McDowell’s 
conceptualism: he is convinced that only a normative account of perception would allow us to 
avoid what Sellars termed the “Myth of the Given,” and provide an alternative to Davidson’s 
 8 
coherentism. Since the interpretation of the colorful expression “Myth of the Given” is not 
easy, I shall leave it for the end of the paper. For the time being, it is important to bear in 
mind that conceptualism is conceived as an alternative to coherentism and, in particular, its 
claim that the mind’s perceptual relation to the world is causal but not normative. Hence, one 
of the driving forces of conceptualism is to make room for a conception of experience that can 
work as a tribunal, i.e. as a test for beliefs (for a useful discussion of this requirement, see 
Gupta 2006). 
In the next section, I present the main motivations that could drive one, first, to sever 
the link between doxastic and perceptual states and, second, to find coherentism wanting. This 
provides us with four arguments in favor of the conceptualist picture. As we shall see, the first 
two arguments are heavily inspired by Evans’s work, whereas the two others are reactions 
against Davidson’s coherence theory. 
3. Motivating conceptualism 
First, Evans (1982: 124) proposed the term “belief” should be reserved to denote a 
sophisticated cognitive state, i.e. a state that is related to the notions of judgment and reason. 
McDowell comments as follows: “Evans’s protest is that, even so, the [doxastic] picture 
connects the content of experience too closely to active thinking for it to be able to do justice 
to experience” (McDowell 1994: 61). We should be careful not to take this move as a bare 
terminological decision. In fact, it betrays a substantial philosophical program: the search for 
the foundations of intentionality in conscious perceptual experiences. Evans needed an 
independent way of characterizing perceptual states because he was after a theory of thought 
based on perceptual states. This gives some weight to his terminological stipulation and his 
characterization of the content of perceptual experiences in terms of non-conceptual 
informational states. 
 9 
Conceptualists accept some of the motivations behind Evans’s program. In their view, 
doxastic theories are problematic, for they cannot provide an explanation of the contribution 
of perceptual experience to belief fixation. In other words, they seem to take for granted what 
a philosophical theory of perception should explain: the perceptual basis of a thought’s 
directedness to the world. This idea is explicit in the following excerpt: 
The [doxastic] proposal is implausible, because it is not the case that we simply find ourselves with a 
yen to apply some concept—a conviction that it has application in the immediate vicinity. Nothing 
could more falsify the facts of the situation (Evans 1982: 229). 
McDowell comments with approval: 
This inclination [to judge, to believe] does not just inexplicably set in. If one does make a judgment, it 
is wrung from one by the experience, which serves as one’s reason for the judgment. In a picture in 
which all there is behind the judgment is a disposition to make it, the experience itself goes missing 
(McDowell 1994: 61). 
McDowell and Brewer agree with Evans’s critical point but not with his solution. 
They concur with him that perceiving cannot be identified with belief formation, since the 
former should be conceivable as a factor on its own, capable of illuminating the intentional 
character of beliefs. In contrast to Evans, however, they purport to characterize primitive 
perceptual states in the space of reasons. This is an important motivation behind McDowell’s 
“minimal empiricism,” i.e. his search for the way the intentionality of propositional attitudes 
is rooted in experience. Brewer (1999) makes this program explicit. He puts forward a two-
tiered theory of perceptual beliefs: according to him, there is a privileged class of beliefs with 
a demonstrative content expressed by utterances of sentences like “this is thus,” and a larger 
class including more detached beliefs with a content expressed by utterances of sentences like 
“this is F,” where “F” stands for a predicate expressing an observable property like red, 
square, etc. Brewer’s idea is that the truth-conditions of basic perceptual beliefs could be fully 
explained by their rational links to experiences (Brewer 1999: 22-3), whereas more detached 
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beliefs would have part of their content thanks to their rational links to basic experiences (29, 
108). 
A second argument exploits an interpretation of the well-known phenomenon of the 
“persistence of illusion.” Some familiar illusions continue to present their illusory appearance 
even though the subject does not believe that things are the way they look (McDowell 1994: 
60). Let us consider the Müller-Lyer illusion: 
 
If one were presented with these lines, one could attempt to explain the fact that one 
line looks longer than the other. One might even claim that its misleading appearance is owed 
to the fact that each line has different hashes (Waldenfels 2000: 48ff) or indicates differences 
in depth (Brewer 2008). Nonetheless, the explanation does not change the fact that one line 
looks longer. Evans makes use of this fact to argue for the belief-independence of 
informational states and, in particular, of perceptual states (Evans 1982: 123).9  
This argument exploits some features of the following situation. Suppose that a naïve 
subject —let us call him John— is presented with the Müller-Lyer illusion, and is then asked 
to describe its content. His natural answer would be: “line B is longer than line A.” Later on, 
an experimenter tells him that he is wrong, since it is a perceptual illusion. In that case, John 
withholds his judgment and reports his experience in a different way: “line B merely looks 
longer than line A.” These philosophers take the subject’s ability to withhold judging (or 
believing) that line B is longer than line A as an argument for the belief-independence of 
perception.10 Conceptualists accept this part of the argument (Brewer 1999: 108, 176). They 
do not, however, take it to be a reason to hold that experiences have non-conceptual content. 
In their view, this is compatible with experiences having pre-doxastic conceptual content. 
After being told that the Müller-Lyer figure is an illusion, John not only keeps perceiving both 
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lines, but also applying concepts like line or relational concepts such as x looks longer than y. 
Hence, given that John is still applying concepts in the latter case, why not say that they had 
been applied during the whole experience in a pre-doxastic way? 
The next two arguments are epistemological. In some texts, McDowell suggests he is 
not interested in identifying all actualizations of concepts with the processes of belief fixation, 
since that would move him toward Davidson’s coherentism (see McDowell 1994: 140, 144, 
186). One of the main motivations for coherentism is the claim that only beliefs can provide 
the subject with reasons, for they are the only states capable of being invoked in justifications. 
A prima facie problem with this view is that there is a tendency to analyze beliefs as 
subjective (or “internal”) states. Thus, someone interested in the objectivity of experience, as 
McDowell and Brewer surely are, could take this as a threat to the task of explaining the 
mind-world relation in a way that preserves objectivity.11 
Still, there is another way a belief approach might lead to a version of coherentism. 
Belief-based accounts of empirical knowledge seem to lead to an instrumental view of the role 
of perceptual experience. Since, in this view, the most primitive intentional states are belief-
like, one needs to posit other (second-order) beliefs to the effect that these beliefs can ground 
other beliefs but, given that beliefs may turn out to be false, these second-order beliefs should 
be introduced to provide a kind of epistemic guarantee of the rational credentials of the first-
order beliefs. The trouble with this view is well-known: either it makes the relation between 
perceptual beliefs and more detached beliefs too indirect or it leads to a regress (see Brewer 
1999: 184, 219). 
In my view, none of the above objections is compelling. Although conceptualists are 
right that perceptual beliefs do not “just inexplicably set in,” this does not entitle us to look 
for their foundation in conscious perceptual experiences. After all, one might try to ground 
them directly in sub-personal perceptual processes. Additionally, perceptual illusions inform 
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us about the relative encapsulation of some perceptual processes, not about the way these 
processes are represented. Furthermore, there is no clear reason to assume that beliefs must be 
analyzed as purely subjective items. As many philosophers have recognized for a long time, 
some beliefs are de re, and depend on the exercise of situated abilities by the subject. 
Considerations of this sort have led me to conclude that there is a version of the 
doxastic theory that is able to cope with the above problems. At the end of the paper, I will 
say something about the persistence of illusion, which is probably the most influential reason 
invoked against doxastic accounts. My main goal in this paper, however, is not to respond to 
the above arguments. That will be the topic of another paper. What I want to do is spell out 
the theoretical motivations behind the conceptualist attempt to develop a pre-doxastic account 
of perceptual experience.   
4. Strong conceptualism 
 In the last three sections, I presented conceptualism as an attempt to illuminate the 
nature of perception-judgment transitions. Its claim is that experience provides reasons for 
belief. As I showed, this view might be interpreted in at least four different ways, depending 
on one’s views on the nature of reasons and perceptual states. I explained why conceptualists 
have conceived of experiences as pre-doxastic states. They have disconnected experiences 
from beliefs because (1) they want to ground belief on experience, (2) they think doxastic 
theories cannot account for known illusions, (3) they want to avoid the coherentist idea that 
beliefs are purely subjective, and (4) they want to rule out second-order accounts of 
perceptual justification.  
 In this section I want to show how a pre-doxastic state could be thought to provide 
reasons for belief, and why this model is naturally understood as supporting the strong claim 
that perceptual experiences are sufficient to justify beliefs (C1).  
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In this context, it is essential to distinguish two sorts of rational sufficiency: structural 
sufficiency and warrant sufficiency. An entity is taken to be structurally sufficient to justify a 
state if it has the required features allowing it to participate in rational relations. Intuitively, 
chairs and plants are not structurally adequate. They lack structural features enabling them to 
participate in justification. Now, states that are apt to participate in rational relations may be 
either sufficient for warrant or not. Traditionally, belief states are taken to be structurally apt 
to justify other beliefs, even though some people think they are not sufficient for warrant. If a 
belief turns out to be false, it is obviously insufficient for warrant. Beliefs, however, are 
thought to enjoy a structure that makes them apt to participate in rational relations.  
The debate between coherentists and conceptualists can be construed as a dispute 
about the structural sufficiency of some entities to participate in justificatory relations. 
Davidson (1986) declared that perception played no evidential role in the justification of 
beliefs, for only a belief may count as a reason for holding another belief. Since conceptualists 
have tried to provide an alternative to Davidson’s view, they are committed to show that other 
entities can participate in such rational relations. In other words, they have to show that non-
doxastic states are structurally adequate to participate in rational relations. That is why one 
can present conceptualism as an attempt to broaden the space of justifiers (see McDowell 
2002: 134). One cannot meet the challenge if one does not provide arguments for the 
existence of non-doxastic justifiers. 
Similar remarks apply in relation to second-order accounts. Traditionally, these views 
are motivated by intuitions about warrant insufficiency, e.g. the fact that I am caused to 
believe that p is not sufficient to be warranted to endorse p. After all, the causal ancestors of 
my belief state could be brain states totally disconnected from the state of affairs it concerns. 
If, however, one is led to posit structurally insufficient states as the basis of belief states, the 
requirement to add a second-order state is more pressing. If the basic state is not apt to 
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participate in justificatory relations, one has to postulate a transformation process that 
produces a second-order state that, in turn, is apt to participate in rational relations. But, why 
should we think that the transformation process is truth-conducing? A second-order premise 
seems required to rule out the possibility that such processes lead us astray. 
These two arguments suggest that conceptualists are committed to the bold claim that 
pre-doxastic states are structurally sufficient to participate in rational relations. Only strong 
conceptualism can provide a genuine alternative to coherentism. In the remainder of this 
section, I will try to show how this could be possible.  
 The conceptualist idea is that there are pre-judgmental actualizations of concepts. The 
latter provide reasons that justify perceptual judgments. The virtues of this approach are clear 
in the light of the persistence of illusion. Its illusory appearance is passively conceptualized at 
a pre-judgmental level. Although conceptualists are not clear on this point, experience can be 
thought to provide an unendorsed content of the form line B is longer than line A. This 
content provides the subject with prima facie reasons, i.e. reasons that she accepts by default 
in ordinary contexts, but which could be defeated by the background belief that she is looking 
at a visual illusion. This example allows us to clarify the conceptualist claim that perception-
judgment transitions are rational. The idea is that the subject is, in principle, free to accept or 
reject the experiential content, even though, in ordinary contexts, she endorses most 
perceptual contents by default. Hence, the naïve observer John will probably accept the 
content by forming the judgment line B is longer than line A, whereas, after being informed, 
he could withhold it by saying “Although line B looks longer than line A, I don’t believe it.” 
 At first sight, the postulation of this pre-judgmental stage allows us to conceive of 
experience as a source of reasons. On the one hand, if perceptual intake is already conceptual, 
it can be seen as a member of the “space of reasons.” On the other, if John is free to accept or 
withhold the content of experience, it seems that the conceptualist has managed to introduce 
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normativity in perceptual experience. She gets this result in at least two ways: first, she 
assumes that only a theory that distinguishes perceiving from judging can preserve the 
subject’s freedom to decide whether she accepts or withholds a perceptual content. If all 
contents were accepted by default, the very idea of normativity would collapse. Second, she 
also assumes that concepts themselves make a perceptual content transparent. To a first 
approximation, one cannot be held responsible for p if one is not acquainted with p. If that 
content is already conceptual, one has already insured an important condition of 
responsibility.12 
 How does this proposal work? It depends on how one understands the actualization of 
concepts in perception. In what follows, I will take for granted that concepts are constituents 
of propositions. Later on, I shall examine McDowell’s most recent proposal.  
In the first model, conceptualists identify the content of perceptual judgments with the 
content of perceptual experiences. This allows explanation of perceptual justification. The 
link proceeds by sameness of content. The conceptualist locates perception within the space of 
concepts but still preserves the intuitive distinction between “inferential” and “non-
inferential” sources of knowledge. Here one would have a non-inferential but still rational 
perception-judgment transition. This idea can be clarified by reflecting on the nature of this 
transition: in some senses, one could think of conceptualist transitions as inferential, given the 
repetition rule: “p → p.” There are reasons, however, to reject this suggestion. First, one 
might argue that the conceptualist picture of perception-judgment transitions does not satisfy 
the repetition rule. This rule should be interpreted as asserting both the antecedent and the 
consequent. If we use Frege’s assertion sign “” to mark the assertive force, we could 
symbolize the repetition rule thus: “p → p.” By contrast, according to the present 
reconstruction, conceptualism is committed to a transition from an unendorsed to an endorsed 
content, something like this: “p → p.” In this view, although the same content appears 
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both in the antecedent and the consequent, it does not instantiate the repetition rule. Second, 
this reconstruction enables the conceptualist to accommodate the defeasible character of 
perception-judgment transitions. If they merely happened to instantiate the repetition rule, it 
would be hard to understand how perception may lead to false belief. But if judgment leads to 
endorsement, one can try to make room for error as arising in the act of endorsement.13  
Additionally, this picture promises to capture an essential aspect of reasons, since it 
conceives of them as conceptually structured. As a matter of fact, most contemporary theorists 
assume that being structured is a necessary condition for being part of our epistemic practices 
of deduction, probabilistic reasoning, induction, etc.14 Furthermore, one might acknowledge 
with Sellars (1956), Brandom (1997), Williamson (2000), Steup (2001), Pryor (2007), among 
others, that entities devoid of syntactic structure could not play the role of reasons:  
[O]nly things with sentential structure can be premises of inference […]. For this reason sensings, 
understood in terms of nonepistemic relations between sense contents and perceivers, are not well suited 
to serve as the ultimate ground to which inferentially inherited justification traces back (Brandom 1997: 
128; see also Brewer 1999: 151). 
I shall call it the “argument from structural complexity.” The argument shows that 
only entities with syntactic complexity are apt to participate in justification relations. Let us 
illustrate its merits with an example taken from Williamson (2000: 195). Someone in court 
accused of murder could hardly be declared guilty just by presentation of a bloody knife to 
the judge. Doing this would be too unspecific to condemn him. In order to decide whether he 
is guilty, it would be necessary to formulate propositions about the bloody knife, such as “the 
knife was found in his house” or, pointing to the accused, “the knife has his fingerprints.” 
Merely presenting the knife could hardly provide a reason to condemn him. As Williamson 
points out, it “is a source of indefinitely many such propositions” (2000: 195).  
The argument stresses that justificatory (or rational) relations are specific in a way in 
which entities lacking syntactic complexity are not. In some accounts, propositions have that 
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complexity. Hence, in those accounts, only propositions can be introduced in justificatory 
relations.  
5. Strong conceptualism is false 
In the last section, I argued that conceptualism is committed to construing perceptual 
experiences as providing sufficient conditions to justify beliefs. This is necessary to provide a 
genuine alternative to coherentism and its claim that only beliefs can participate in rational 
relations. I showed that one could eventually succeed by conceiving of perception-judgment 
transitions as moves from unendorsed to endorsed contents. In this section, I shall criticize 
this strong version of conceptualism on the basis of two arguments. As we shall see, these 
objections are neutral on the nature of reasons. 
First of all, the arguments presented so far do not show that the content of perceptual 
experiences itself is propositional. What the argument from structural complexity grounds is 
the weaker claim that the evidence invoked in justificatory practices is propositional, not that 
experiences are propositionally structured. Williamson makes this point: “Experiences 
provide evidence; they do not consist of propositions. So much is obvious. But to provide 
something is not to consist of it” (Williamson 2000: 197; emphasis mine). 
One might use Williamson’s earlier example to show that a non-conceptualist theorist 
can accommodate the requirement of propositionality. Take a naïve realist who conceives of 
perceptual experiences not as providing conceptual contents but a direct access to ordinary 
objects like the bloody knife (see Brewer 2006). According to her view, perception would 
acquaint subjects with objects without being propositionally structured. Propositions would 
appear just when one forms judgments about that object. This line of reply would also be open 
to theorists who introduce a “transformation model” of perception, i.e. a model where the 
transition from perception to belief involves a constructive process or a change from one 
representational format to another. This is the model favored by most defenders of non-
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conceptual content. A non-conceptualist can argue that propositions intervening in empirical 
justifications are built at the level of judgment, not at the level of pre-doxastic perceptual 
content.15 
I am not arguing here for these specific views. What these considerations show is that 
it is not necessary to conceive of experiences as propositionally structured in order to satisfy 
the argument from structural complexity. Many alternative models would do as well. What is 
needed is a model where propositions become available in experience, i.e. an account in 
which subjects smoothly move from their perception of the world to the formation of 
appropriate propositional contents. 
Second, although there are good reasons to think that propositionality is a necessary 
condition for reasons, having a propositional structure is not sufficient for a state to be able to 
participate in rational relations. Let me explain. A number of propositional attitudes are said 
to have structured contents, although they do not play the role of reasons.16 To take the 
Müller-Lyer illusion again, suppose an experimenter asked a dogmatic subject this: “Why do 
you think that line B is longer than line A?” One could imagine a series of answers involving 
structured contents, but which would yield inappropriate justifications: 
Wants:  *Because I want line B to be longer than line A. 
Assumptions: *Because I assume that line B is longer than line A. 
Wonderings: *Because I wonder whether line B is longer than line A. 
These examples suggest a straightforward response to the conceptualist. In his attempt 
to provide a pre-doxastic picture of experience, he has severed a necessary ingredient of 
justifications: what Sellars (1956) aptly termed their endorsement dimension. The intuition 
behind this objection is that having a conceptual or propositional structure is not sufficient to 
build up a justifying state. Reason-giving states are not just made out of conceptual contents, 
but also from what Frege called assertive force. Assertive force is constitutive of judgments 
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and beliefs, but, since the conceptualist wants to provide an alternative view to doxastic 
theories and coherentism, he has lost this dimension from his picture. As indicated above, this 
line of argument can be easily generalized against non-conceptualist propositional views like 
the one favored by Peacocke (1992, 2001). If one takes it that experiences deliver unendorsed 
non-conceptual propositional contents, and assumes that such contents provide reasons for 
belief, one could be criticized on the same count. Propositionality is not (structurally) 
sufficient for a state to justify another state. 
This line of argument becomes more perspicuous when one considers the metaphor of 
the tribunal of experience, which conceptualists take as a test for any theory of perception. 
Contrary to Davidson, McDowell thinks this image is crucial to an understanding of human 
empirical rationality because it allows for a characterization of belief systems as rationally 
sensitive to the “impact” of the world. According to McDowell, only a theory capable of 
making sense of perceptual experience as a source of reasons could make sense of that 
revealing metaphor. 
In the light of the previous remarks, it is clear that the conceptualist is not entitled to 
conceive of experience as a tribunal either. Just take the following example. My father and I 
plan to go play tennis in the afternoon. In the meantime, I hear on the radio that it has been 
raining all day long and, as a result, I change my mind: “Since it is raining, we won’t play 
tennis.” When my father comes, I greet him with the following comment: “It’s raining! It’s 
impossible to play tennis!” My father, who just came in from outdoors, replies: “No, it is not 
raining anymore. Are you ready to take revenge?” How should we conceive of my process of 
belief revision? If I were a skeptic, I would probably walk to the nearest window in order to 
check if it is raining. If I were to see that the sun is shining, I should update my previous 
belief in order to match it to the present weather. It seems crucial, however, that I accept that 
the sun is shining. The fact that the sun is shining could hardly eventuate in a belief revision 
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process if I were not to take it (at least tacitly) that the sun is shining. Even if the conceptualist 
is right and not all perceptual contents are “endorsed,” as in John’s case, the point is that only 
accepted contents can be considered in belief revision. Non-accepted contents would probably 
be ignored; after all, they would not “tell me” that the sun is shining.17 
6. Conceptualism and the nature of reasons 
In the last section, I suggested that my two objections were neutral on the nature of 
reasons. One might be inclined, however, to resist this idea. If one conceives of reasons as 
structured entities, such as facts or propositions, one will be able to hold a strong version of 
conceptualism. In what follows, I shall reply to this line of argument. For that purpose, I will 
begin by mentioning the motivations to treat reasons as structured entities. 
First, there is a strong tendency to reify reasons in natural languages, reflected in the 
use of “reason” as a complement of the verbs “to give” or “to provide.” From this standpoint, 
it seems natural to see reasons as objectively existing entities one can share with the members 
of one’s community. Furthermore, as Pryor (2007) points out, we quantify over reasons and 
also identify them with the content of “that”-clauses. It seems natural to say: “I had two 
reasons to refuse the job” or “my reason for resignation was that I was tired of my boss.” If 
reasons can be given, counted, and specified by means of “that”-clauses, why not identify 
them with facts or propositions? This idea seems to underlie the following quote from 
McDowell: “The point of the idea of experience is that it is in experience that facts 
themselves come among the justifiers available to subjects” (McDowell 1998a: 430; see also 
McDowell 1995).  
Second, the conceptualist case might seem more compelling because of the tendency 
in analytic philosophy to individuate reasons by means of propositions. This policy is useful 
when one provides a rational reconstruction of a theory as a set of propositions or when one 
 21 
tries to formalize logical proofs.18 This approach might seem convenient if one is interested in 
highlighting the relations of logical dependence among different statements. 
Here is my reply. To begin with, one should bear in mind what one is invoking reasons 
for. If one is interested in the psychological role of reasons and the sensitivity of belief to 
perceptual experience, one needs a notion of a reason capable of reflecting the subject’s point 
of view and the rationality involved in belief revision. In these cases, it would be odd to 
abstract from the subject’s attitude towards those contents. To have any impact on belief, 
contents must be represented. The point is that not all representings are well suited to play the 
desired rational role. Only assertive representings can move the subject to change her mind in 
the light of experience. 
This explains, to some extent, why it would beg the question to defend a propositional 
account of reasons just by dint of a semantic analysis of the reification mechanisms in natural 
languages (for a recent example of this strategy, see Alvarez 2008). Semantic analyses do not 
reveal the workings of minds. Assuming that the image of a tribunal is a plausible test of a 
theory of perceptual experience, and granting that this image shows that one cannot abstract 
from the subject’s attitudes, these semantic tests are defective. To illustrate this, it is important 
to see that the present point can be made without presupposing any particular ontology of 
reasons. Let me elaborate.  
Some philosophers have compared facts to events and exploited the parallels to show 
that facts can be introduced in causal explanations. Consider these two examples:  
(1) The fact that Napoleon recognized the danger to his left flank caused him to move his 
troops forward. 
(2) It was a fact, not a true statement, that the train was diverted that made me late for the 
lecture.19 
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These fact-involving constructions cannot play the rational role required in the present 
context. Although the word shape “fact” is used in the two cases to introduce causal relations, 
it does not show that facts themselves rationalize belief revision. Example (1) owes its 
plausibility to the cognitive act introduced within the scope of “the fact that”: Napoleon’s 
recognizing the danger to his left flank. If, however, one drops this ingredient, the explanation 
is defective. It could be that there was a danger to his left flank and Napoleon did not notice it. 
As a result, he would not have reacted in the appropriate way. Hence, it is not the fact that 
there was a danger to his left flank that led him to react in the appropriate way but the fact that 
he recognized it.  
Concerning example (2), it provides a case where facts are used to introduce causal 
explanations. The trouble is that this causal relation is not of the kind in which the 
conceptualist is interested. To make sense of the tribunal of experience, one needs a notion of 
causation that rationalizes belief revision processes, i.e. a notion that makes it rational for the 
agent to revise her beliefs. But this is not what the example (2) provides. It gives a case of a 
causal relation that exculpates the speaker for having arrived late. He was late because the 
train was diverted.  
This discussion shows that, even if one endorses an ontology of reasons as facts or 
propositions, one should allow that the image of experience as a tribunal has an irreducibly 
pragmatic element. It is immaterial whether we reify reasons or introduce causal relations in 
fact-involving constructions. To decide whether a reason can participate in justification, we 
have to explain the subject’s attitude to that reason. In ordinary life, whenever I give a reason 
and I am being sincere, I do not give an unendorsed reason. By the same token, if I decide to 
go play tennis on the ground that the sun is shining, my behavior is not rationally based if I do 
not take the content of my experience at face value.20 
 
 23 
7. The conceptualist retreat: propositional conceptualism  
The arguments presented so far show that C1 is wrong. A major consequence of this 
view is that one should construe conceptualism as a weak thesis. In other words, one could 
not see conceptualism as a genuine alternative to coherence theories of justification. In the 
following two sections, I will show how some weaker positions (C2, C3) could be thought to 
avoid the previous objections, and suggest that they undermine conceptualism. Furthermore, I 
will argue that these versions fail to provide an adequate picture of perception-judgment 
transitions. 
An obvious solution is to weaken the conceptualist position by rejecting the claim that 
experiences themselves provide reasons. We have already seen this alternative in a quote from 
Williamson: “to provide something is not to consist of it.” Byrne reacts in a similar way: “The 
answer ‘Because it looks blue’ to the question ‘How do you know it is blue?’ is appropriate 
because it gives the source of one’s reason rather than a statement of them” (Byrne 2005: 249 
fn 20). This view is also implicit in some texts from McDowell and Brewer. In his “Replies” 
to a volume dedicated to his work, McDowell describes experience as “an invitation to accept 
a proposition” (McDowell 2002: 278). Similarly, in a reply to Brandom, McDowell contrasts 
the claim that perceptual experience has reasons with (what he takes to be) the (weaker) claim 
that it provides reasons: 
My point about perceptual experiences is that they must provide rational credentials, not that they must 
have them. Perceptual experiences do not purport to report facts […] experience is simply the way in 
which observational thinking is directly rationally responsible to facts (McDowell 1998b: 407; see also 
his 1998a: 439). 
We find a similar reaction in Brewer’s texts: 
[Perceptual contents] are not yet in the arena of epistemic appraisal. For they are not yet something to 
which the subject is in any way committed. Nevertheless, once grasped in this way, these unendorsed 
contents do provide reasons of a genuinely epistemic kind for their own endorsement in belief (Brewer 
1999: 223). 
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This solution can be criticized on a number of counts. Just take McDowell’s unclear 
contrast between “having” and “providing” reasons. Suppose we read “providing” in the sense 
of “giving”. How can one give something one does not have? Or suppose its role in providing 
reasons is that of an intermediary, like a messenger. Here we would face a problem already 
denounced by Davidson (1986): if experience is an epistemic intermediary between mind and 
world, one has a picture of experience that risks losing its openness to the world. 
In a more charitable reading, one could interpret the use of the verb “to provide” in the 
sense of “setting or making arrangements for some purpose.” This would fit well with the 
previous suggestion that experience provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
reasons (C2). In other words, perceptual reasons would be composite or hybrid entities made 
out of a perceptual content endorsed in judgment.   
According to C2, experiences provide conceptual contents in perceptual experiences, 
but these contents do not count as reasons. Reasons are formed when the subject accepts the 
content of experience at the level of perceptual judgment. This two-stage analysis would 
block the argument based on the tribunal scenario. Perception would provide structured 
contents, but it would not rationalize belief revision in the light of experience. But there are 
problems with this approach. On the one hand, it is difficult to reconcile it with almost all 
conceptualist pronouncements on the rational role of perceptual experiences. Brewer writes 
that “perceptions provide reasons for endorsement in belief” (see Brewer 1999: 19, 20), which 
is naturally read in quite a strong sense: perceptions provide reasons, not the materials for 
reasons. 
It is possible to find similar examples in McDowell’s writings. In a previous quote 
(McDowell 1998a: 430), we found that “facts themselves come among the justifiers available 
to subjects.” This view is consonant with other texts: 
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[A]ppearances are rationally linked to spontaneity at large: the way appearances can constitute reasons 
for judgements about objective reality—indeed, do constitute reasons for judgements in suitable 
circumstances (‘other things being equal’) (McDowell 1994: 62; emphasis mine). 
It seems odd to write that facts themselves come among the justifiers, that appearances 
constitute reasons, or that they do constitute reasons for judgments, and insist that experiences 
are not sufficient to justify beliefs. 
Even if one accepts that conceptualism provides the materials to form reasons, the 
transition from unendorsed to endorsed contents looks arbitrary. If perceiving is simply the 
entertaining of contents, why are subjects compelled to endorse them in judgments, instead of 
casting doubt on them? Why is judging that things are thus and so the appropriate (and, if 
circumstances are favorable, the mandatory) cognitive attitude towards these contents? The 
worry is that epistemic norms are interesting only insofar as they are binding or compelling. If 
my cognitive system is governed by modus ponens and I am faced with the contents (p → q) 
and p, I am compelled to infer q. But, if perceiving is the entertaining of propositions, there is 
nothing in perception that compels me to believe its contents. A basic ingredient is still 
missing. 
Let us develop this point in a slightly different way. If experiences are made out of 
pre-doxastic contents, then they are not in a position to stop the well-known regress problem. 
BonJour develops this idea in his analysis of the given:  
[T]he proponent of the given is caught in a fundamental and inescapable dilemma: if his intuitions or 
direct awarenesses or immediate apprehensions are construed as cognitive, at least quasi-judgmental (as 
seems clearly the more natural interpretation), then they will be both capable of providing justification 
for other cognitive states and in need of it themselves; but if they are construed as noncognitive, 
nonjudgmental, then while they will not themselves need justification, they will also be incapable of 
giving it. In either case, such states will be incapable of serving as an adequate foundation for 
knowledge. This, at bottom, is why empirical givenness is a myth (BonJour 1985: 69). 
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BonJour should not be understood as claiming that conceiving perceptual experience 
as belief-like is sufficient to stop the regress problem. The claim is weaker. If one presupposes 
a dualism of a content being given and a cognitive grasp of that content, one cannot solve the 
regress problem. If judgment is severed from the contents of experience, what does justify 
one’s taking the contents at face value? To avoid this objection, the connection between both 
ingredients should be internal. That is why the objection applies to conceptualism. Since it is 
forced to conceive perception-judgment transitions in an additive, external way, its account of 
the rational role of experience is unsatisfactory. Pace McDowell, endorsing a given content 
becomes “a frictionless spinning in the void” (McDowell 1994: 42).  
A doxastic theorist could exploit this impasse to defend her proposal. As our analysis 
of the persistence of illusion illustrates, there are cases in which one can suspend judgment. 
Nevertheless, the doxastic theorist is partly right when she claims that the epistemic role of 
perception as a source of knowledge is internally related to belief. Whenever I want to justify 
an empirical belief, I do not refer to a bare experiential content but to my perceptual beliefs. 
One cannot measure the epistemic significance of experiences by known illusions, since those 
illusions are cases in which experiences are prevented to fulfill their justificatory role. Pace 
conceptualists, perceptual beliefs are the bearers of justification par excellence. I will come 
back to this point at the end of the paper.      
8. The conceptualist retreat: non-propositional conceptualism  
One could develop the hybrid theory of reasons in a slightly different way. In a recent 
paper, McDowell (2008a) rejects the propositional account of perceptual content and replaces 
it with the idea of intuitive conceptual contents. This picture can be seen as a version of C3, 
the claim that experiences are non-propositional pre-doxastic states. I am not sure whether I 
really understand McDowell’s proposal. As a result, my objections will be rather speculative. 
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As far as I can see, however, it fails to give an adequate model of perception-judgment 
transitions.  
In this picture, which he traces back to Kant, perceptual experience provides contents 
that, for the purposes of this paper, can be compared to the contents expressed by a use of the 
phrase-type “this F”, where “F” stands for a predicate like “cube.” According to McDowell, 
some transitions from perception to judgment involve a process by which this content is made 
explicit by articulating the predicative structure. Hence, the transition would lead from “this 
F” to “this is an F” (e.g. “this is a cube”). Although the perceptual content would not be a 
reason for holding the belief that this is an F, it would contain the reason in an inexplicit (or 
unarticulated) form. Crucially, both “this F” and “this is an F” would count as conceptual, 
since they would be the product of the same faculty, what McDowell calls, following Kant, 
the faculty of spontaneity or understanding. 
I criticize McDowell’s recent views in my forthcoming paper (2011). In the present 
context, I want to question the idea of non-propositional conceptual contents.  
My first point concerns the idea that concepts can be actualized in both propositional 
and non-propositional format. If one frames the view in psychological terms, this means that a 
single faculty could have deliverances of quite different sorts. This raises the further question 
of how faculties should be individuated. Crucially, natural candidates are incompatible with 
McDowell’s proposal. If we were to follow Kant and individuate faculties by the rules or 
principles that govern them, it would be strange to qualify both “this cube” and “this is a 
cube” as actualizations of the same faculty. After all, if the conceptualist is right, the 
principles at work in the two cases must be different. They lead to different contents. On the 
other hand, if we individuate faculties by their deliverances, there is some reason to classify 
propositional and non-propositional contents as products of different faculties. In other words, 
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there would be no reason to hold that the faculty of concepts is actualized in two ways: 
propositional and non-propositional.  
This is not a knockdown argument. It suggests, however, that one cannot get the idea 
of non-propositional conceptual contents for free. One should tell a story about the way one 
individuates psychological faculties, and how exactly one and the same faculty can give rise 
to different contents. My suspicion is that talking this way easily leads to reifying 
psychological functions. This is something we should try to avoid.   
My second and third arguments are related to the notion of propositionality. Notice 
that, if this picture is right, the conceptualist cannot exploit one of its main arguments against 
non-conceptualism: the argument from structural complexity, i.e. the idea that only structured 
contents can be invoked as reasons for belief. That would be a serious shortcoming. Although 
perceptual contents are supposed to be conceptual, they do not have the required structure to 
participate in justification. In most accounts, reasons are structured entities, since only 
structured entities can be invoked as premises. But, if one gives up the propositional view of 
the content of experience (C1, C2), one cannot preserve its reason-giving role.  
Finally, it is far from clear that McDowell has managed to justify the inclusion of non-
propositional contents. When people think about non-propositional content, they usually have 
in mind maps (Evans 1982; Burge 2005) or iconic contents (Crane 2009). But McDowell is 
after non-propositional conceptual contents. As far as I can see, if they are conceptual, there is 
no reason not to take them as propositional. Let me elaborate. 
If one puts forward a theory of non-propositional content, one has to presuppose a 
theory of propositions. The appeal to the word shapes “this F” and “this is an F” suggests that 
McDowell has taken syntactic considerations as marks of propositionality. This looks like an 
idiosyncratic move. It is at odds with the widespread account of propositions in terms of truth-
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conditions. Hence, it is controversial to assume that utterances of the phrase “this cube” do 
not express propositions just because they differ from “this is a cube” in their syntax. 
A more attractive view is, however, in the offing. One could take a phrase like “this 
cube” as elliptical for “this is a cube.” Hence, utterances of “this cube” would have truth-
conditions in the same way in which utterances of “this is a cube” have truth-conditions. 
Actually, it seems natural to take “cube” as predicating a property of a salient, bounded object 
denoted by “this.” In favor of this view, one could say that an adequate paraphrase of “this 
cube” is: the property being a cube is true of this (pointing to the same object). Similarly, if 
you are asked: “What would the world be like if utterances of the two expressions were 
correct?” a natural reply would be: “There should be a cube in the speaker’s vicinity.” In the 
terminology of possible world semantics, one could even say that when uttered in the same 
context both “this cube” and “this is a cube” exclude the same possibilities. Hence, they have 
the same content. 
If these remarks are right, they allow us to take an utterance of “this cube” as being 
assessable as true or false, as any propositional content is. If uttered in the same context, the 
two phrases would be true under exactly the same circumstances. Strictly speaking, there 
would be no difference in the contents expressed by the two expressions, but only a 
superficial difference in the vehicles (linguistic or psychological).  
The present considerations provide a challenge to the defender of non-propositional 
conceptual contents. The present view provides him with a simple way of explaining the 
transition from “this cube” to “this is a cube.” The transformation of “this cube” into ‘“this is 
a cube” is valid just because the two utterances do have the same content, i.e. because the 
transformation is not synthetic but preserves their content.21  
Nevertheless, even if we grant these remarks, it has already been shown that a 
propositional structure without assertive force does not have rational impact on a belief 
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system. This suggests that, if the conceptualist is to avoid the objections presented above, she 
has to find a different way of including perceptual experiences within the space of reasons. 
Here the conceptualist seems to extend the space of reasons by means of a “potentiality.” Any 
item that can be articulated in judgment belongs to the space of reasons. Hence, although an 
utterance of the sentence “this cube” does not convey a reason, it could be transformed into a 
reason by uttering a sentence of the form “this is a cube.” 
It is hard to see what would remain of conceptualism in this picture. After all, this 
recapitulates some of the main features of non-conceptualist views. Let me explain. Some 
theories of non-conceptual content take the content of experience as richer than the content of 
a judgment. In these views, perception-judgment transitions involve selection routines by 
virtue of which some features already encoded at lower levels of perceptual processing get 
articulated. As Fodor (2008: 181) points out, “the idea is that the role of concepts in the 
perceptual analysis of experience is to recover from experience information that it contains.” 
Crucially, these lower processing levels are not accessible to the subject. What the subject 
invokes as a reason is a judgment, but this judgment is based on richer contents. In this sense, 
those theories combine the merits of doxastic approaches and non-conceptual theories. The 
demanding notion of justification starts at the level of belief. But, in the case of perceptual 
beliefs, there is a non-conceptual perceptual basis upon which it is grounded. 
Strictly speaking, we do not have access to non-propositional conceptual contents nor 
to non-conceptual contents. If epistemic activities are discursive, coherentism is right and 
conceptualism is wrong. After all, non-propositional contents do not stand in rational relations 
with beliefs. A source of reasons is not a reason. Hence, if non-propositional contents are just 
a source of reasons, the transition from these contents to perceptual judgments does not 
qualify as rational.  
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9. The conceptualist Myth 
Let us take stock. In the previous sections I located the claim that experiences provide 
reasons in a broad perspective. I argued that, among the four possible ways of understanding 
it, conceptualism is only compatible with C1, given its commitment to provide an alternative 
to coherentism. If one drops this commitment, one can construe it as a weaker claim: C2 or 
C3. I claimed that C1 is false, and C2 and C3 provide inadequate accounts of perception-
judgment transitions. Even if C2 or C3 were right, they could not rule out the existence of 
non-conceptual content. To be sure, this is not an unpleasant result. But it would be bad news 
for the conceptualist. He has failed to rule out the sort of view I favor: perceptual justification 
starts at the level of perceptual belief, and what makes it perceptual is the fact that it is based 
on sub-personal non-conceptual states. 
In what follows, I will develop two further points. First, I will show that the 
conceptualist oscillation between C1 and C3 is a clear symptom of the Myth of the Given.22 
Second, I will suggest that a way of avoiding the Given is to claim that beliefs are the minimal 
units of justification (C4). To reach these conclusions, some stage setting is necessary. 
Conceptualists insist that experiences themselves are conceptually articulated because 
they want to rule out the Myth of the Given. But here some caution is in order. After all, it is 
not clear what the colorful expression “Myth of the Given” means. The situation is even 
worse because there are ways of misconstruing it.  
The first misinterpretation is owed to McDowell’s line of argument in Mind and 
World. According to him, the Myth of the Given is the thesis that the space of reasons 
overrides the space of concepts.23 The trouble with this characterization is that it makes the 
notion of the Given uninformative. We are told that the Myth of the Given posits a non-
conceptual level of justification, but it is hard to see why one should be blamed for doing that. 
Furthermore, this definition has no dialectic force. On the one hand, if you are a defender of 
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non-conceptual content, it is not reasonable to claim that you are committed to a Myth just 
because you assume that the space of reasons overrides the space of concepts. You can still 
ask: why is there something mythological in the distinction between conceptual and non-
conceptual content? On the other hand, McDowell’s formulation misleadingly implicates that 
it is sufficient to conceive of perceptual experience as conceptual in order to avoid the Myth 
of the Given. If the Myth arises from one’s incapacity to account for the rational role of 
experiences, conceiving them as conceptual will not do. The arguments presented above show 
that representing structured contents is not sufficient for a state to justify a belief. 
Another common misconception of the Myth of the Given is to think that it denounces 
the thesis that the basic materials of perceptual experience are made out of mental objects, 
usually termed “sense data” or “impressions” (see Dingli 2005: 6, 67). To be sure, some 
classical versions of the Given take this form. Moreover, some of the most explicit targets of 
Sellars’s arguments in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind are sense datum theories. He 
also stresses, however, that the Given may appear in different guises: 
Many things have been said to be ‘given’: sense contents, material objects, universals, propositions, real 
connections, first principles, even givenness itself. And there is, indeed, a certain way of construing the 
situations which philosophers analyze in these terms which can be said to be the framework of 
givenness (Sellars 1956, §1: 14). 
Sellars then adds: “If, however, I begin my argument with an attack on sense datum 
theories, it is only as a first step in a general critique of the entire framework of givenness” (§ 
1: 14). 
One can exploit these remarks to formulate the Myth of the Given. A claim is said to 
be a version of the Myth of the Given if it follows from or presupposes the “framework of 
givenness.” To a first approximation, the framework of givenness conceives of the mind’s 
relation to some entities as a two-place relation of the form “S ψ’s E,” where “S” stands for an 
animate being, “ψ” for a relation verb, and “E” for a repeatable entity. Quite importantly, 
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there is no restriction on the sorts of entities involved. Pace the conceptualists, conceptual 
contents and propositions can instantiate the framework of givenness! The following table 
provides a summary of some of the distinctions Sellars considers: 
 
Cognitive/Epistemic/Normative Non-Cognitive/Non-Epistemic/Natural 
Representings  Representeds 
Sensings (seeings, touchings)   Sense data, Material objects 
Understandings Propositions, Facts, First principles 
 
The central feature of this framework is that it is dualistic, in a sense aptly described 
by Brandom (1994: 615): “A distinction becomes a dualism when its components are 
distinguished in terms that make their characteristic relations to another ultimately 
unintelligible (Descartes’s dualism is, as always, the paradigm).”24 What makes the 
framework a myth is that one describes both terms of the relation in incompatible ways but 
still has to introduce transactions between them. More precisely, suppose one characterizes 
left-hand elements as As and right-hand elements as non-As. In the course of developing the 
framework, one might be committed to the following fallacies:  
(M1)  One takes As for non-As. 
(M2) One is forced, for explanatory or conceptual purposes, to introduce transactions 
(or relations) between As and non-As.    
Let us use Descartes’s mind-body dualism as an example: it is committed to (M1). 
Although he defines the mind as really distinct from the body, he hypothesizes that the former 
is located in the pineal gland. The trouble is that only bodily entities are located. It is also 
committed to (M2): in order to account for perceptions or emotions, it is led to introduce 
causal transactions between mind and body, even though the latter is not a res extensa.25  
There are different possible reactions to these problems. One might think that some 
forms of (M1) or (M2) are indispensable moves. That is why Descartes suggested that there 
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was an interaction between mind and body, even though it was difficult to understand it. Or 
one could simply take (M1) or (M2) as good reasons to describe all the items in a new, non-
dualistic way. One could simply take all elements as As, thereby suppressing the putative 
category of non-As, or vice versa. This was essentially Hobbes’s and Berkeley’s strategy. The 
former suppressed mental substances and the latter material substances. Whatever strategy 
one chooses, the underlying reason is the same: there was something wrong in the framework; 
in distinguishing between As and non-As, one fell prey to a Myth.   
The framework of givenness is dualistic in a similar way. It distinguishes two kinds of 
elements: on the one hand, epistemic, normative or cognitive items and, on the other, non-
epistemic, natural or non-cognitive items. Sellars’s task is to denounce illegitimate moves like 
(M1) and (M2) between left-hand elements and right-hand elements. His attacks on the Given 
are of the utmost relevance, since they show that its damaging effects have implications in a 
broad spectrum of domains: the acquisition of concepts, the epistemology of perception, the 
mind’s attunement to perceptual uniformities, first-person authority, the existence of other 
minds, etc.  
These remarks are intended to show that the conceptualist account of experience is an 
instance of the framework of givenness. Let me explain. Conceptualists have assumed that the 
Myth of the Given concerns the nature of perceptual content. This is not right, however. The 
non-conceptualist falls prey to the Myth of the Given if his distinction between the conceptual 
and the non-conceptual is shown to introduce a form of dualism and if, in the development of 
his framework, he is committed to illicit moves such as (M1) or (M2). For instance, he takes 
non-conceptual contents as different from conceptual contents, but ascribes to them features 
that only conceptual contents could enjoy. Or he wants to connect non-conceptual contents 
with conceptual contents in an inferential way, without showing that the former have the 
required structure to participate in inferential relations. Similarly, the conceptualist can only 
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avoid the Myth of the Given if he proves that he does not introduce a dualism that commits 
him to illicit moves such as (M1) or (M2). 
As a matter of fact, the different versions of conceptualism (C1-C3) examined above 
are committed to illicit moves like (M1) or (M2). This is because conceptualism is based on a 
dualistic conception of the relation between perceiving and judging. In his critique of sense 
datum theories, Sellars protested when he found that some theorists tried to justify epistemic 
states on the basis of non-epistemic states (M2). Similarly, in their attempt to provide a pre-
doxastic actualization of concepts, conceptualists have posited epistemically neutral states 
(i.e. contents lacking assertive force) as reasons for belief. This is the main conclusion of our 
critique of C1. Their epistemic neutrality follows from their incapacity to account for the role 
of experience in belief revision, which requires that some contents be accepted and others 
rejected. In his analysis of the contents of experiences, however, the conceptualist has 
abstracted from epistemic attitudes. This is clear in the following text:  
In my picture of experience, there is no need for cognitive activity (‘taking’) on our part to equip our 
passive impressions with objective content. They have it anyway, independently of any cognitive 
activity we are going in for when they occur. [T]here is no need for any active ‘taking’ to make 
experience what it is (McDowell 2005: 86; see also 2008b: 248-249).  
Conceptualists think that the divide between conceptual and non-conceptual contents 
introduces a dualism. Now, the divide between perceiving and taking is a dualism as well. It 
instantiates the framework of givenness insofar as it severs the attitudes from experience. 
Sense datum theorists presupposed a dualistic framework when they distinguished mental 
objects from sensing episodes. The conceptualist creates a new gap between one’s prior 
entertaining of a proposition in perceptual experience and one’s accepting it in judgment. He 
is led to this implausible result since he assumes, without argument, that it is sufficient to be 
conceptually articulated to belong to the “space of reasons.” Since being conceptual is not 
sufficient for a state to provide justifications, however, there is a clear sense in which the 
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space of concepts overrides the space of reasons. If we are interested in providing a rational 
basis for beliefs, we need more than conceptual contents.26 
Similar considerations apply when one tries to construe conceptualism in a weaker 
sense (C2, C3). McDowell has done a great service to philosophy in denouncing our tendency 
to depict the mind’s relation to the world by means of two-component pictures. Construing 
conceptualism in a weak way, however, is just another two-component picture. It is a picture 
that leads to the sorts of fallacies denounced by Sellars. To illustrate the point, I shall show 
how the weaker versions of conceptualism are committed to (M1) or (M2). 
If one conceives of experiences as merely providing the materials for reasons, one is 
committed to (M1). Strictly speaking, this view does not explain how experience can work as 
a tribunal, since only states with doxastic force rationalize belief-revision processes. The 
conceptualist emphasis on the tribunal imagery, however, suggests the contrary. He advertises 
a conception of experiences as capable of preserving the tribunal of experience. In doing so, 
she ascribes to a pre-doxastic state some features that it would only enjoy if it were a doxastic 
state. Similarly, both C2 and C3 are committed to (M2). Although they conceive transitions 
from perception to belief as rational, they fail to ascribe to them the structure we ordinarily 
count as rational. In the propositional model, judgment is seen as putting a “seal of 
acceptance” on a propositional content “presented” by experiences. In the non-propositional 
model, it is seen as an articulation process by means of which one makes a content already 
given explicit. It is hard to see why someone would count these transactions as moves in the 
space of reasons. 
10. Towards a doxastic account 
These problems could be seen as providing indirect evidence for a position like C4: if 
perceptual experiences have doxastic force, they are sufficient to rationalize belief revision. In 
order to avoid (M1) and (M2), we should eliminate the spurious category of pre-doxastic 
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experiences from epistemology. After all, belief states not only have the required structure but 
they are also adequate for participation in justification relations. As Frege taught us, judging 
is acknowledging a content as true and, as pragmatists have insisted, acknowledging a content 
as true involves a disposition to act as if it were true. In order to make sense of the tribunal of 
experience, we need a conception of experiences that disposes subjects to treat their contents 
as holding. This is precisely what we get if these contents are interpreted as having doxastic 
force. As far as the epistemology of experience is concerned, seeing that thus and so is like 
believing that thus and so. 
In defense of this claim, it would be necessary to consider two live options. First, one 
should inquire whether a doxastic account could respond to the argument from the persistence 
of illusion. Second, one should ask whether one could analyze experiences as doxastic states 
or whether it is more plausible to consider them as propositional attitudes in their own right. 
Concerning the persistence of illusion, I think it is a mistake to assume that one could 
generalize from known illusions to the psychological nature of all perceptual experiences. 
First, we have been given no reason to assume that experiences have a uniform psychological 
structure. This is even more problematic when one considers things from a cognitive point of 
view: what would be the cognitive advantage of having experiences with uniform structure? 
Second, it is essential to our experience of persistent illusions that we are not disposed to use 
them as reasons. If a subject withholds judging that one line be longer than the other, she is 
not disposed to act as if one line were longer than the other. In other words, she is not 
disposed to invoke her experience as a reason. Hence, it would be strange to use epistemically 
defective cases such as persistent illusions to assess the psychological structure of 
epistemically relevant experiences.  
Interestingly, disjunctivists have exploited similar considerations in support of 
different conclusions (see McDowell 1986, Williamson 2000). One cannot assume that the 
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psychological structure of experiences in the “good cases” is identical to the psychological 
structure of experiences in the “bad cases.” If known illusions are seen as epistemically bad 
cases as well, there is no reason to assume that their putative lack of doxastic force should be 
generalized to the good cases as well. After all, known illusions are cases in which there are 
background beliefs that block the formation of the relevant belief, preventing it from playing 
any genuine justificatory role (for discussion, see Pitcher 1971 and Smith 2001).  
Recently, Andy Egan (2008) has urged that one could conceive of belief systems as 
“fragmented” or “compartmentalized.” Similarly, Alex Byrne (2009) has suggested that there 
is no direct path from the persistence of illusion to the belief-independence of experience. In 
their view, it is perfectly possible to think that our experience of the Müller-Lyer illusion 
involves a belief that one line is longer than the other, and another reflective belief that they 
are of the same length. Similarly, Burge (2005) describes sub-personal perceptual processes 
as having “commitments.” Although he draws a line between perception and thought, the 
vocabulary of commitments seems perfectly adequate to characterize beliefs. This clearly 
suggests that one could extend the notion of belief to describe not only reflective states but 
also encapsulated perceptual processes like the ones intervening in persistent illusions. From 
this perspective, known illusions would fail to show the belief-independence of experience. 
They would merely show the relative encapsulation of beliefs. As Byrne puts it, “inconsistent 
beliefs are perfectly common” and, if Egan is right, having a compartmentalized belief system 
has cognitive advantages.  
Although the arguments presented here are compatible with these suggestions, they 
remain neutral on this issue. My own view is that we should reserve the term “belief” to 
characterize cognitively demanding states at the conscious level. When experiences are 
invoked as reasons, they are conscious. As a result, it is perfectly appropriate to characterize 
them as doxastic states. The crucial point is that this does not reduce experiences to beliefs. 
 39 
First, they may be grounded on sub-personal non-conceptual states. Second, there is no reason 
to assume that all experiences have a doxastic structure. The claim is just that they have a 
doxastic structure when they fulfill their epistemic role.      
This leads us to the second question. Do the precedent arguments lend support to the 
claim that perceptual experiences are beliefs? Or could a non-doxastic account be invoked to 
explain the epistemic role of experiences? 
Solving these questions would require a detailed analysis of the individuation criteria 
of psychological states. If one individuates them by their functional role, a case could be made 
to show that perceptual experiences differ from beliefs, since not all beliefs stand in the same 
causal relations to action and perceptual sub-personal processes. Consider two cases: (1) my 
belief that Beijing is the capital of China, and (2) my experience that there is a tiger in front of 
me. Although the two states dispose me to act in certain ways, one could detect differences in 
the sorts of actions that are functionally connected with the two states. Seeing a tiger in front 
of me, I would run as fast as I can. When I hold that Beijing is the capital of China, however, 
there are no such direct connections with action. Similarly, one could hold that my second 
state is more tightly connected with perceptual processes than my first belief, which I could 
have gained from testimony. 
By contrast, if we individuate states by their psychological attitude and their content, 
we could argue that, if experiences play an epistemic role, they have the structure of beliefs. 
After all, experiences only participate in rational relations insofar as they exhibit two features 
of beliefs: propositionality and assertive force. To refute this approach, one would have to 
characterize the attitude or content of experiences in terms incompatible with our concept of 
belief. If one is liberally minded, however, and assumes that the two features mentioned 
above are sufficient for a state to count as a doxastic state, we would be led to a claim like C4. 
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I am not sure whether the distinction between these options is a substantial one. If one 
assumes, however, that concepts of psychological states are theoretic, one could not expect to 
solve the dispute by invoking piecemeal arguments. Theoretical concepts owe their meaning 
to the theories in which they are embedded. Hence, we could only evaluate the two options if 
we were in a position to compare the theories one could construe on the basis of the two 




I presented earlier versions of this paper at the University of Munich (May 8th 2007), at the 8th Congress of the 
Austrian Society for Philosophy in Graz (7th-9th June 2007), at the 13th International Philosophy Colloquium in 
Evian (15th-21st July 2007), and at the Institut Jean-Nicod (16th April 2008) in Paris. I am indebted to the people 
who attended those meetings for raising a number of questions that helped me improve the paper. Jérôme Dokic, 




Alvarez, Maria (2008) “Reasons and the Ambiguity of ‘Belief’”, Philosophical Explorations 
Available on-line: URL = <http://www.journalonline.tandf.co.uk/>. 
Armstrong, David (1968) A Materialist Theory of Mind, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Bermúdez, José Luis (1995) “Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal States”, Mind 
and Language, 10 (4): 333-369. Reprinted in: York H. Gunther, ed. (2003) Essays on Nonconceptual 
Content, Cambridge (MA), London, MIT Press: 183-216. 
Bermúdez, J. L. (1998) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge (MA), London, MIT Press. 
BonJour, Laurence (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard 
University Press. 
Brandom, Robert (1994) Making it Explicit, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press. 
Brandom, R. (1997) “Study Guide”, Wilfrid Sellars (1997) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, with an 
Introduction by Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom, Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard 
University Press: 119-181. 
Brewer, Bill (1999) Perception and Reason, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Brewer, B. (2005) “Do Sense Experiential States Have Conceptual Content?” Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup, 
eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell: 217-230. 
 41 
Brewer, B. (2006) “Perception and Content”, European Journal of Philosophy, 14 (2): 165-181. 
Brewer, B. (2008) “How to Account for Illusion”, Fiona Macperson & Adrian Haddock  eds., Disjunctivism 
Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press: 168-180. 
Burge, Tyler (2005) “Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology”, Philosophical Topics 33 (1), 2005: 1-78. 
Burge, Tyler (2009) “Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes”, in: Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi, eds., The 
Philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford, Oxford University Press: 246-316. 
Byrne, Alex (2005) “Perception and Conceptual Content”, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup, eds., Contemporary 
Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell: 231-250. 
Byrne, A. (2009) “Experience and Content”, Philosophical Quarterly, 59 (236): 429-451. 
Chalmers, David (2006) “Perception and the Fall from Eden”, Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne, eds., 
Perceptual Experience, Oxford, Oxford University Press: 49-125. 
Crane, Tim (2009) “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 452-469. 
Davidson, Donald (1986) “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, Ernest LePore, ed., Truth and 
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, Blackwell: 307-319. 
Reprinted: Davidson, D. (2001): 137-153.      
Davidson, D. (2001) Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Dennett, Daniel C. (2002) “Seeing is Believing – Or is it?” Alva Noë & Evan Thompson, eds., Vision and Mind: 
Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, Cambridge (MA), London, MIT Press: 481-495. 
DeVries, Willem A. (2006) “McDowell, Sellars, and Sense Impressions”, European Journal of Philosophy, 14 
(2): 182-201. 
Dingli, Sandra M. (2005) On Thinking and the World: John McDowell’s Mind and World, Hants, Ashgate.  
Dodd, Julian (2000) An Identity Theory of Truth, Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Dokic, Jérôme (2004) Qu’est-ce que la perception? Vrin, Paris. 
Dretske, Fred (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press. 
Echeverri, Santiago (2010) “Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience”, G. W. Bertram, R. Celikates, 
Ch. Laudou & D. Lauer, eds., Expérience et réflexivité: perspectives au-delà de l’empirisme et de 
l’idéalisme, Éditions L’Harmattan, Paris: 15 pp.   
Echeverri, S. (2011) “McDowell’s Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism”, European Journal of Philosophy, ## 
(#): 1-30. Published on-line: DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00383.x 
Echeverri, S. (in preparation) “A Doxastic Account of Perceptual Experience”.   
Egan, Andy (2008) “Seeing and Believing: Perception, Belief Formation, and the Divided Mind”, Philosophical 
Studies, 140 (1): 47-63. 
Ernst, Gerhard (2001) “Liefert die Wahrnehmung Gründe?”, Proceedings der GAP, Paderborn, Mentis: 171-179. 
Evans, Garret (1982) The Varieties of Reference, edited by John McDowell, Oxford, Clarendon Press.  
Fodor, Jerry (2008) LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Frege, Gottlob (1918-1919) “Der Gedanke: eine logische Untersuchung”, in: Beiträge des deutschen Idealismus, 
2: 58-77. Reprinted in: Frege, Gottlob (2003) Logische Untersuchungen, 5th edition, edited by Günther 
Patzig, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 35-62. English translation: Frege, Gottlob (1997), “Thought”, 
The Frege Reader, edited by Michael Beaney, Oxford, Cambridge (MA.), Blackwell: 325-345.  
 42 
Glüer, Kathrin (2009) “In Defense of a Doxastic Account of Perceptual Experience”, Mind and Language, 24 
(3): 297-327. 
Gupta, Anil (2006) Empiricism and Experience, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Heck, Richard (2000) “Non-conceptual Content and the ‘Space of Reasons’”, Philosophical Review, 109 (4): 
483-523. 
Kant, Immanuel (1781/1787) Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Nach der ersten und zweiten Originalausgabe von Jens 
Timmermann. Mit einer Bibliographie von Heiner Klemme, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1998.   
McDowell, John (1986) “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, Philip Pettit and John McDowell, 
eds., Subject, Thought, and Context, Oxford, Clarendon Press: 137-68.  
McDowell, John (1994) Mind and World, Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard University Press. 
McDowell, J. (1995) “Knowledge and the Internal”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 40: 877-893. 
Reprinted in: McDowell, J. (1998c): 395-413. 
McDowell, J. (1998a) “Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality”, Journal of Philosophy, 95 
(9): 431-491. 
McDowell, J. (1998b) “Responses to Commentators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (2): 403-
431. 
McDowell, J. (1998c) Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press  
McDowell, J. (1999) “Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism”, Lewis E. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of 
Donald Davidson, Chicago, Open Court: 87-104. Reprinted in: J. McDowell (2009) The Engaged Intellect: 
Philosophical Essays, Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard University Press: 115-133. 
McDowell, J. (2002) “Responses”, Nicholas H. Smith, ed., Reading McDowell on ‘Mind and World’, 
London/New York, Routledge: 269-305. 
McDowell, J. (2005) “The True Modesty of an Identity Conception of Truth: A Note in Response to Pascal 
Engel (2001)”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13: 83-88. 
McDowell, J. (2008a) “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, Jakob Lindgaard, ed., John McDowell: Experience, 
Norm, and Nature, Blackwell, Oxford: 1-14. 
McDowell, J. (2008b) “Responses”, Jakob Lindgaard, ed., John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature, 
Blackwell, Oxford: 200-267. 
McDowell, J. (2009) The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard 
University Press. 
Noë, Alva (1999) “Thought and Experience”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 36 (3): 257-265. 
Peacocke, Christopher (1992) A Study of Concepts, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.  
Peacocke, C. (2001) “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?” Journal of Philosophy, 98: 239-264. 
Pitcher, George (1971) A Theory of Perception, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Pryor, James (2007) “Reasons and That-Clauses”, Philosophical Issues, 17 (1): 217-244. 
Roxbee-Cox, J. W. (1971) “An Analysis of Perceiving in Terms of the Causation of Beliefs I”, F. N. Sibley, ed., 
Perception: A Philosophical Symposium, London, Methuen: 23-64.  
Runzo, Joseph (1977) “The Propositional Structure of Perception”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 14: 211-
220. 
 43 
Schantz, Richard (2001) “Der Inhalt der Wahrnehmung”, Thomas Grundmann, ed., Erkenntnistheorie: 
Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart, Paderborn, Mentis: 249-263.  
Sellars, Wilfrid (1956) “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, 
vol. 1, edited by Herbert Feigl & M. Scriven, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in: 
Sellars, W. (1997) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, with an Introduction by Richard Rorty and a 
Study Guide by Robert Brandom, Cambridge (MA), London, Harvard University Press.  
Smith, A. D. (2001) “Perception and Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62 (2): 283-309. 
Stalnaker, Robert (1998) “What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?” Philosophical Issues: Concepts, 9, edited 
by E. Villanueva, Atascadero (CA), Ridgeview: 339-352. Reprinted in: York H. Gunther, ed. (2003) Essays 
on Nonconceptual Content, Cambridge (MA), London, MIT Press: 95-106. 
Steup, Matthias (2001) “Foundationalism, Sense-experiential Content, and Sellars’ Dilemma” (Ms). 
 Available on-line: URL = < http://web.stcloudstate.edu/msteup/>. 
Waldenfels, Bernhard (2000) Das leibliche Selbst: Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Leibes, edited by 
Regula Giuliani, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp. 
Williams, Michael (2006) “Science and Sensibility: McDowell and Sellars on Perceptual Experience”, European 
Journal of Philosophy, 14 (2): 302-325. 




                                                
1 I examine McDowell’s recent view in section 8. 
2 Among the early proponents of doxastic theories, see Armstrong (1968), Pitcher (1971) and Roxbee-Cox 
(1971). For more recent defenses of doxastic theories, see Byrne (2009), Dennett (2002), Glüer (2009), Smith 
(2001), and my own paper (in preparation). Noë (1999) argues for a conceptualist view of experience. Since he 
claims, however, that experience is judgment-dependent, it is more akin to a doxastic theory. The same applies to 
classical theories such as Kant’s (1781/1787). 
3 To be sure, there are conceptual motivational states, like desiring that p. But believing is usually taken as the 
paradigm of a conceptual epistemic state.  
4 For the purposes of this paper, I take beliefs as mental dispositions and judgments as mental acts. From this 
perspective, a belief Bp may be instantiated by different judgments J1p, J2 p… Jnp at different times. I remain 
neutral on the issue whether judgments are conceptually prior to beliefs or vice versa. 
5 “According to the position I am recommending, conceptual capacities are already operative in experience itself. 
It is not that actual operations of conceptual capacities first figure only in actualizations of dispositions to judge, 
with which experiences are identified—so that experience is connected with concepts only by way of a 
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potentiality. Having  things appear to one a certain way is already itself a mode of actual operation of conceptual 
capacities” (McDowell 1994: 62). 
6 For a more recent defense of conceptualism, see Brewer (2005), who claims that none of his original arguments 
for the conceptual character of experience has been adequately refuted. Brewer (2006, 2008) criticizes the claim 
that experience has “correctness conditions” and argues for a non-representational theory of experience. 
Interestingly, he still believes that conceptualism is to be preferred to non-conceptualism. 
7 I shall ignore the contrast between acceptance and belief. Although important, it is orthogonal to the arguments 
in this paper, and it does not play any role in the theories of experience considered here.  
8 This distinction plays an important role in Brewer’s approach. He usually describes the epistemic contribution 
of perception by using the sentence: “perception provides a reason to endorse in belief.” According to Smith 
(2001), the view of perceptual experience as the entertaining of a proposition was already developed by Runzo 
(1977: 214-5): “To perceive an object or state of affairs, X, is, and is no more than, to be episodically aware of a 
set of propositions about X […] This awareness of (sets of) propositions during perceiving is akin to 
entertaining.” 
9 Bermúdez (1995: 185) and Schantz (2001: 257) appeal to this argument in order to develop a non-conceptualist 
view. Not all philosophers agree on this point, however. 
10 I am indebted here to Sellars’s (1956, § 14: 37-38) story about John and the Necktie Salesman, and to Smith’s 
(2001) discussion. 
11 In a more recent paper, McDowell (2003: 158) stresses the point made earlier: perceiving is not equivalent to 
acquiring a belief, since a perceptual episode can fail to lead to the formation of the corresponding belief. This 
misses Davidson’s point. Although there can be perceptual episodes that fail to lead to belief, the question is 
whether pre-doxastic episodes themselves can work as justifiers. 
12 I criticize this assumption in my forthcoming paper (2010). I sketch an alternative picture of normativity (in 
preparation). 
13 For further discussion, see Glüer (2009) and my own paper (2011). 
14 Brewer (1999: 150-153) introduces this argument. See also McDowell (1994: 7). As we shall see later, the 
non-propositional version of conceptualism cannot exploit this common line of argument.  
15 One could develop this point by exploiting Dretske’s (1981) distinction between two kinds of representational 
formats, analog and digital. From this perspective, perceptual states would have an analog content that does not 
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provide reasons but constitutes the source of an indefinite number of (possible) reasons. In order to produce a 
reason, the mind has to digitalize this content. 
16 I presuppose a conception of propositions as structured entities. This assumption is shared by most participants 
in the debate, given the influence exerted by Frege on most of them. If one has a picture of propositions as sets 
of possible worlds, conceptualism becomes false: possible worlds are not individuated by their constituents, and 
their content is not sensitive to differences in cognitive value. A position along these lines has been defended by 
Stalnaker (1998). 
17 I am echoing Frege here, when he claims: “How does a thought act? By being grasped and taken to be true” 
(Frege 1918-1919: 61; 1997: 344). “Thoughts are not wholly unactual but their actuality is quite different from 
the actuality of things. And their action is brought about by a performance of the thinker; without this they would 
be inactive, as far as we can see” (62; 345).  
18 But, even in logic, not all philosophers proceed that way. A good example can be found in Frege’s concept-
script, which introduces the “judgment stroke” to indicate the force of a content.  
19 I borrow both examples from Dodd (2000: 91, 110 fn 4). In the same context, Dodd gives a number of relevant 
references of people who stress the causal relevance of facts. 
20 Here I side with Williams (2006: 310-311) and Ernst (2001).  
21 In a recent paper, Tyler Burge (2009: 270) describes some cases in which an indexical or demonstrative can be 
said to “contain” an attributive representation. In his terminology, “that sofa” contains “sofa.” As I understand 
him, the idea is that a content C contains another content C’ if (1) both are parts of a single syntactic unit, and (2) 
C’ restricts (or constrains) the application conditions of C. Hence, “she” is restricted to females, “now” to times, 
and “there” to places. 
To decide whether these relations count as propositional is a delicate question. Burge is working with a notion of 
attribution that is non-propositional and non-conceptual. His main project is to extend the notion of attribution to 
perceptual processes without over-intellectualizing the latter. Since he assumes that predication is a condition of 
propositionality, not all forms of containment would qualify as cases of propositionality. I cannot discuss the 
details of Burge’s proposal in the present context. Insofar as he exploits these remarks to favor a theory of non-
conceptual content, however, it is unclear whether they could be invoked in favor of McDowell’s idea of non-
propositional conceptual contents.   
22 In a recent paper, McDowell (2008b: 208-9) reacted against a similar accusation made by DeVries (2006). I 
am inclined to side with DeVries, although I am not sure whether our reasons are exactly the same. 
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23 “The idea of the Given is the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends 
more widely than the conceptual sphere” (McDowell, 1994: 7; see also his 1995: 408-9). Dokic (2004: 104) 
accepts this formulation in his commentary of Mind and World. 
24 McDowell (1999: 116) makes exactly the same point in connection with Davidson. 
25 Jérôme Dokic pointed out to me that it is odd to qualify (M1) and (M2) as methodological fallacies instead of 
category mistakes. There is, however, a difference here. Category mistakes can be denounced when one has 
independent reasons to think that two entities belong to different categories. For instance, one has independent 
reasons to think that someone is making a category mistake if she says that she went to the University of Oxford 
and to Oriel College. After all, we know for sure that Oriel College is one of Oxford’s colleges. In the present 
case, it is difficult to speak of a category mistake for it is not obvious that As and non-As belong to different 
categories. It is only when assessing the framework that one realizes that the move is illicit.    
26 This assumption is pervasive in McDowell’s writings: “My claim that the dualism is incoherent depends on 
the thought that the domain of rational interrelatedness is coextensive with the domain of the conceptual” (1999: 
121; emphasis mine).  
